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Amartya Sen’s contribution to development thinking1 
by Frances Stewart and Séverine Deneulin 
 
Development as Freedom (DAF) presents an overview of Sen’s thinking about 
development, pulling together ingredients familiar from his previous work. Assessing this 
book then comes close to evaluating Sen’s contribution to development thinking. 
Undoubtedly, the contribution is of major importance, and we shall spend the first part of 
this paper explaining why we believe this to be the case. Yet there remain problems, both 
at a theoretical and political/policy level, which mean, in our view, that for some 
important issues in contemporary development, one has to go beyond Sen. Why we 
believe this will form the second part of the paper. 
 
Sen’s major achievement lies in his capabilities (variously termed ‘freedoms’) approach. 
In this he not only presents a philosophical alternative to the utilitarianism which 
underpins so much of economics, but in so doing also offers an alternative development 
objective which can be used to inform a wide range of issues, from markets to gender, 
democracy to poverty.  In brief he argues that ‘for many evaluative purposes, the 
appropriate “space” is neither that of utilities (as claimed by welfarists), nor that of 
primary goods (as demanded by Rawls), but that of substantive freedoms - the 
capabilities - to choose a life one has reason to value’ (DAF, 74). 
 
For many years, almost since ‘development economics’ as a subject started, critics have 
struggled against the domination of income-maximisation as the single objective of 
economic development. Growth of Gross National Product (GNP) might occur along 
with growing unemployment, worsening income distribution, even (though this is rare) 
rising incidence of monetary poverty, poor provision of social services, deteriorating 
indicators of health and nutrition, and so on. One of the earliest to point to the defects of 
GNP was Dudley Seers, who argued for the ‘dethronement of GNP’.2 Seers himself 
suggested replacing the income-maximisation objective with employment growth, but 
that is clearly a very narrow and unsatisfactory measure of success. There followed a 
succession of suggestions for alternatives: for example, weighting income to give higher 
weights to the poor (Chenery et al. 1979), devising a measure of the Physical Quality of 
Life (PQLI), which included infant mortality, life expectancy and adult literacy (Morris 
1979); assessing Basic Needs (BN) provision, alternately by looking at the actual bundle 
of BN goods and services provided (BN I - (ILO 1976)), or by measuring the ‘full life’, 
indicated for example by life expectancy and a measure of educational achievement (BN 
II - (Streeten et al. 1981); (Stewart 1985)).  These (and others not listed here) pointed 
towards the need to improve on GNP in two ways: one was to give priority to the poorer 
sections of society above the richer; the other to look beyond income to the quality of life 
                                                 
1  We would like to thank Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi for helpful comments on a previous draft. 
2 He used the term in an oral contribution to a 1970 conference: in the written record of this meeting, it was 
the Director General of the ILO, not Seers, who spoke of dethroning GNP. (Robinson and Johnston 1971) 
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(QOL), because income is just a means (albeit often an effective one) for improving life 
conditions, and the translation from income to quality of life is by no means an automatic 
one. 
 
While these alternatives all gave greater weight to resources going to the poor than with 
GNP maximisation, only the PQLI and BN mark II approach  moved away from the use 
of inputs rather than outcomes, i.e. indicators of quality of life itself, as a way of 
assessing well-being.  But while moral outrage justifiably inspired the BN and PQLI 
approaches, they did not offer any substantive philosophical justification for the 
objectives they put forward. Not only did this weaken their appeal as an alternative to the 
complex (if flawed) utilitarian edifice, but it also meant that their message was 
necessarily confined to poor people in poor societies. 
 
In contrast, Sen’s capability approach has much stronger philosophical foundations: his 
approach builds on that of Aristotle in arguing that development is about providing 
conditions which facilitate people’s ability to lead flourishing lives, while he has been a 
most effective critic of the purely consequentialist views of the utilitarians, their failure to 
recognise agency, or that individual needs, capacities and context must enter into an 
assessment of wellbeing, not just utility or happiness.  Sen agrees with Rawls on the 
priority to be given to free choice (hence the emphasis on capabilities as an objective - 
what people may choose to be or do, rather than on functionings - what people actually 
are or do), but rejects Rawls’ focus on primary goods, which are the same for everyone 
and thus do not allow for varying rates of conversion from goods to individual QOL 
depending on the circumstances of the individual. Moreover, unlike the BN approach, the 
enlargement of capabilities is an objective which extends well beyond poor people and 
poor societies with implications for people and societies at all levels of income. Thus in 
contrast to the other approaches which move away from the income maximisation 
objective, Sen’s capability approach meets most of the requirements needed for a 
satisfactory alternative measure of wellbeing: in particular he provides a philosophical 
justification of the chosen objective as well as a powerful critique of maximisation of 
income as an objective, and he assesses individual wellbeing directly and not via inputs.  
 
A rather crude summary of the contrast between approaches is provided in the Table. One 
feature that emerges from this is that some approaches are much more clear-cut about the 
indicators that should be used, and the weight to be given to specific indicators and to 
specific groups of people (notably the poor), than others. Hence they provide a more 
immediate guide to policy. Three views of how to tackle the issue of choice of 
components and weights can be distinguished in the Table.  First, the 
pragmatics/moralists represented by the BN and PQLI approaches simply assert the 
overriding priority to be given to those whose BN fall below some minimum, and the 
kinds of goods (in BN mark I), or life characteristics (BN mark II) that should be given 
priority,  thereby implicitly giving first priority to the unmet needs of the poor. Secondly, 
Rawls and Nussbaum provide quite complex philosophical justification for the choice of 
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particular components – Rawls justifying a set of primary goods which are needed by 
every person as a prerequisite for any type of satisfactory life, while Nussbaum similarly 
identifies a list of central capabilities that anyone must have if they are to lead a good 
human life.  Neither provides an indicator of how the components are to be weighted – 
indeed it is suggested that they are incommensurate. Rawls, of course, provides strong 
philosophical justification for adopting a distribution which is most favourable to the 
worst off.  They too thus provide a clear roadmap for policy makers.  
 
On these issues, Sen is unique, in looking to an ‘evaluative exercise’ to be performed by 
individuals and by society to form judgements which embody a system of weighting.   In 
Sen’s view, “For a particular person, who is making his or her own judgements, the 
selection of weights will require reflection, rather than any interpersonal agreement….  in 
arriving at an ‘agreed’ range for social evaluation…. There has to be some kind of 
reasoned ‘consensus’. . . . This is a “social choice” exercise, and it requires public 
discussion and a democratic understanding and acceptance.” (DAF, 78).   
 
It is easy to attack the BN school for paternalism - who are they as outsiders to lay the 
law down about objectives? And, in a more sophisticated way, Rawls and Nussbaum are 
open to the same criticism as far as primary goods/central capabilities are concerned– 
since these primary goods/central capabilities are components that each human being 
must have if she wishes to live a good life, whatever her conception of the good life is 
(Rawls 1971, 1993; Nussbaum 2000). By not making a judgement himself on these 
issues, Sen avoids this type of criticism - and indeed points the way to what seem to be 
admirably democratic and self-determined decisions. Yet there is a cost: without a 
democratic understanding about priorities there is very little content to Sen’s approach. 
Planners who are told that their job is to enhance people’s capabilities to do or be 
valuable things may well be at a loss. They might well ask:  Whose capabilities should be 
given priority? Which priorities are valuable? Are there priorities within the category of 
valuable capabilities?  They are told to come to a democratic understanding. Yet 
democratic discussions are not so easy to have and democratic understandings even more 
problematic. Many societies lack even the trappings of democracy. Where there is 
democracy, opinions tend to be filtered through and influenced by political parties, by 
social norms, by power relations within society across classes, genders and ethnicities. 
There may be no consensus. There may be democratic decisions that lead to a worsening 
in the position of the poor, harm to the environment, an increase in defence expenditure 
at the cost of social expenditure etc. Actual existing democracy does not present a neat 
solution to the difficult problem of defining priorities. Indeed many of the countries that 
are pursuing growth objectives at the cost of others we may consider are more valuable 
are themselves democracies, at least in name.  
 
There is a dilemma here. It is easy to agree that the GNP approach, which involves 
market-determined priorities, is unsatisfactory from many points of view, including a 
distributional perspective, the neglect of externalities and that of differences in 
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conversion rates from income to individuals’ quality of life.  The more paternalistic 
approaches avoid these problems by giving clear priority to enhancing the position of the 
poor, and especially certain basic needs or capabilities.  Sen, while clearly sympathetic to 
these priorities, seems to be right in arguing that these are issues that need to be solved 
within the society affected and not by outsiders.  Yet domestic solutions - even 
democratic ones - often move away from the pursuit of the basic needs or capabilities of 
the poor. The problem is that Sen’s concept of democracy seems an idealistic one, where 
political power, political economy and struggle are absent. We will return to this below. 
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Alternative approaches to assessing wellbeing 
Approach to 
development 
objective 
Greater 
weighting 
income of the 
poor 
Use of outcome 
indicator of qol 
Priority given to 
liberty 
Philosophical 
justification of 
approach 
Justification for 
choice of 
indicators  
Justification of 
weighting of 
indicators 
GNP No No Not explicit; but 
consumer choice is 
needed to justify 
indicator 
Yes – utilitarianism Yes, but not 
satisfactory 
Yes, but not 
adequate 
Employment Indirectly No No Weak No Only one 
indicator 
Redistribution 
with growth 
Yes No Not explicit; but 
consumer choice is 
needed to justify 
indicator 
Yes - utilitarianism,  
plus giving greater 
weight to poorest  
Yes, but not 
satisfactory 
Attempted but not 
solved 
PQLI Indirectly Yes No Pragmatic/ 
Moralistic 
Some No 
Basic Needs I 
(ILO) 
Indirectly No No Pragmatic/ 
Moralistic 
No No 
Basic Needs II 
(Streeten etc.) 
Indirectly Yes No Pragmatic/ 
Moralistic 
Some  Rough 
Rawlsian Yes No Yes Yes Overlapping 
consensus 
Overlapping 
consensus 
Capabilities 
(Sen) 
Implicit Yes Yes Yes Indirectly -
evaluation 
exercise 
Indirectly -
evaluation 
exercise 
Capabilities 
(Nussbaum) 
Implicit Yes Yes  Yes – Aristotelian Overlapping 
consensus 
Overlapping 
consensus 
 
 
A solution to the issue of components and weighting of valuable capabilities is essential 
to make the approach useful in development policy. In practical work, Sen solves this by 
accepting that to be healthy, well-nourished and educated are basic capabilities, which, 
presumably he would argue, would always get democratic support. In effect, this shifts 
the approach to one that is almost identical with the BN (at least its second version). 
Sen’s approach, however, retains two major advantages compared with the BN one. First, 
it can potentially be widened to a much richer menu, where such capabilities as being 
able to play a musical instrument, to fly a plane, to act in a play, or to skateboard, may 
also be included, although how to evaluate and compare these non-basic capabilities, 
particularly at a societal level, remains subject to the problems of evaluation discussed 
above. Secondly, it has the advantage of the elegant philosophical base which Sen 
provides in beautifully clear and masterful prose. 
 
With the foundations accepted, capabilities (or freedoms) then provide a way of 
exploring many other issues: poverty, for example, is then defined as being deprivation in 
the space of capabilities rather than income or commodities, although it has implications 
for both. Similarly, for inequality, whether within the household or society. DAF uses the 
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framework to enhance analysis of many other issues, including demography, culture and 
the environment.  
 
In sum, the capabilities approach provides an alternative framework to the income metric 
for the analysis of a wide range of issues. As noted earlier, it could potentially have much 
to offer in the analysis of richer societies, even though to my OUR knowledge Sen has 
not done much in this direction yet.  
 
In my OUR view, however, there are two important areas where the approach is deficient 
-  both areas where the GNP approach also falls down, so this is not an argument for a 
return to that approach, but for going beyond Sen’s current thinking.  Both problems stem 
from the individualism of the approach. My OUR first problem with this individualism is 
that it leads to neglect of critical aspects of human wellbeing and activity as an important 
area for evaluation and policy. The second problem is that Sen tends to avoid of issues of 
political economy, which results in an apparent (and knowing Sen it can only be 
apparent) naivety in his treatment of both democracy - as already noted above - and 
modern capitalism. 
 
Despite the leap forward Sen has accomplished by providing the conceptual 
framework necessary to move human well-being from the domain of utility to the domain 
of the lives of human beings, where it belongs, his capability approach shares the 
individualism of the utilitarian approach. where individuals are assumed to be atoms who 
come together for instrumental reasons only, and not as an intrinsic aspect of their way of 
life  THOUGH THEY BOTH RECOGNISE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SOCIAL 
EMBEDDEDNESS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS – THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH 
THROUGH THE ENDOGENEITY OF PREFERENCE,3 THE CAPABILITY 
APPROACH THROUGH THE SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON WHAT INDIVIDUALS 
COME TO VALUE,4 THEY BOTH PLACE THE EVALUATION OF STATE OF 
AFFAIRS IN THE SPACE OF INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE FOR THE FORMER 
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS FOR THE LATTER:  “[...] societal arrangements are 
investigated in terms of their contribution to enhancing and guaranteeing the substantive 
freedoms of individuals.”5  The approach is an example of methodological individualism, 
“according to which all social phenomena must be accounted for in terms of what 
individuals think, choose and do.”6  THE CAPABILITY APPROACH DOES INDEED 
RECOGNISE THE EXISTENCE OF It implies that irreducible social goods do not exist, 
i.e. objects of values which cannot be decomposed into individual occurrences, or 
expressed in terms of individual characteristics because they are only comprehensible 
against a background of common practices and understanding. For example, nodding 
ones head can only be understood, and only has a meaning, in a particular social context. 
In some societies, nodding implies assent, in others dissent, and in yet others it has no 
implications at all. Without the irreducible social good of a communication code, an 
                                                 
3 SEE FOR EXAMPLE BECKER 1996. 
4 FOR EXAMPLE SEN OFTEN MENTIONS THE CASE OF THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL NORMS 
UPON WOMEN’S (LACK OF) VALUATION OF THE CAPABILITY TO READ AND WRITE. 
5 DAF, xiii. 
6  Bhargava 1992, p 1. 
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individual nodding would be incomprehensible. Among irreducible social goods are 
language and behaviour codes, including systems of moral norms.7 YET, A common 
feature of all individualistic literature, including both utilitarianism and Sen’s 
capabilities, is that those IRREDUCIBLE SOCIAL GOODS, THOSE ‘structures of 
living together’8, whether social norms, cultural practices, trust, or whatever, are seen as 
purely instrumental to individual well-being and only to be valued in these terms.  They 
are considered as ‘capital’, something that is to be used in the production of something 
else rather than something that is valued per se : “INDIVIDUALS LIVE AND 
OPERATE IN A WORLD OF INSTITUTIONS. OUR OPPORTUNITIES AND 
PROSPECTS DEPEND CRUCIALLY ON WHAT INSTITUTIONS EXIST AND HOW 
THEY FUNCTION. NOT ONLY DO INSTITUTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO OUR 
FREEDOMS, THEIR ROLES CAN BE SENSIBLY EVALUATED IN THE LIGHT OF 
THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR FREEDOM.”9   
 
Three reasons will be advanced here for making structures of living together an 
additional space of evaluation for evaluating the quality of life, and also one which may 
be influenced by development policies.  The first can easily be, and arguably is, 
incorporated in Sen’s approach; the others fit in less easily.  
 
First, in so far as some structures are instrumental to individual capabilities, some 
are enabling and other constraining, and one needs an evaluation space that would 
distinguish valuable from non-valuable structures of living together from this 
perspective, i.e. that would distinguish the instrumental structures that lead to an 
expansion or a reduction in individual capabilities. For example, some societies - notably 
those with high inequality and low levels of social interaction - generate high levels of 
criminality which make it difficult for individuals to achieve the capability of personal 
security - while in other more stable and egalitarian societies personal security may be 
much more easily achieved.  
 
Second, ‘structures of living together’ are not only instrumental to individual 
capabilities, but are also an intrinsic part of individual lives, so that one needs to be able 
to distinguish the structures that are an intrinsically valuable component of an individual 
human life. An essential component of human life is that they live together. Individuals 
are not social atoms who co-exist with one another as isolated islands and join together 
solely for advancing their own positions, AS OFTEN ASSUMED IN THE LIBERAL 
CONTRACTUALIST TRADITION. A new-born child does not come into existence as a 
unit whose existence and life is independent of family members, of their norms, culture, 
etc. Nor does an adult enter the community of human beings because he/she has a 
personal interest in so doing; (s)he is in a community of other humans, and does not 
adhere to such a community. No human being could live without those structures of 
living together, since they constitute the very conditions for individual human existence. 
                                                 
7 See (Taylor 1995) for the notion of irreducible social goods. 
8 The expression is taken from the French Aristotelian philosopher Paul Ricoeur, see Ricoeur (1992, 
p.194). One should note that structures of living together are not always positive, for example, there can be 
structures of oppression. 
9 Sen (1999:142). 
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The nature of society in which a person lives is therefore an essential component of her 
QOL. 
 
Third, individual agency - which forms a core element of Sen’s capabilities 
approach - is not a tabula rasa, it is influenced by and develops according to particular 
structures of living together, so we need an evaluation space through which to distinguish 
the type of structures that help promote individual agency and determine which 
objectives people value. Throughout his works, Sen emphasises that people should not be 
seen as passive patients of social patterning but active agents of their own well-being: 
“The person is not regarded as a spoon-fed patient, in that the capability approach 
introduces freedom of choice amongst a menu of options (attainable functionings) into 
well-being assessment.”10  Yet people are conditioned socially, influenced by their 
background, by social norms, so no-one is truly autonomous, independent of the 
influences of the society in which they live. Some societies provide conditions more 
favourable to the development of individual agency than others, and also more favourable 
to making what would generally be agreed to be ‘good’ choices than others.  
 
Sen asserts that development is a matter of expanding the capabilities that people 
have reason to choose and value. These capabilities do not encompass the capability to 
do or be anything a human can do or be since some capabilities have negative values (e.g. 
murdering), while others may be trivial (riding a one-wheeled bicycle). Hence there is a 
need to differentiate between ‘valuable’ and non-valuable capabilities, and indeed, within 
the latter, between those which are positive but of lesser importance and those which 
actually have negative value. Both the extent of agency and the objectives that people 
value depends in part on their environment. Hence one needs to assess the structures 
which influence agency and the formation of objectives. For example, we need to be able 
to differentiate the social structures that lead to the values prevalent in Idi Amin’s 
Uganda, or genocidal Rwanda, from those in more peaceful contexts, such as in Mali or 
Costa Rica. 
 
Sen, of course, recognises extensively that social forces influence individual 
capabilities, AS WE EMPHASISED EARLIER: “Individuals live and operate in a world 
of institutions. Our opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what institutions 
exist and how they function. Not only do institutions contribute to our freedoms, their 
roles can be sensibly evaluated in the light of their contributions to our freedom.”11 Yet 
though he recognises that individual freedoms (or capabilities) are “quintessentially a 
social product”, because “there is a two-way relation between (1) social arrangements 
(such as economic, social and political opportunities) to expand individual freedoms and 
(2) the use of individual freedoms not only to improve the respective lives but also to 
make the social arrangements more appropriate and effective”,12 he makes individual 
freedoms and capabilities the one relevant space for evaluation of quality of life, with 
structures of living together assessed only instrumentally.  
                                                 
10 DAF, 241. 
11 DAF, 142. 
12 DAF,  31. 
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Given the reasons outlined above, the task of development policies should not 
only be to enhance ‘valuable’ individual capabilities, but also to enhance ‘valuable’ 
structures of living together. The latter can be defined as the structures of living together 
which will have a positive impact on people’s well-being (both instrumentally and 
intrinsically), which will enable individuals to be freer agents and which will encourage 
them to form valuable objectives. In other words, flourishing individuals generally need 
and depend on functional families, co-operative and high-trust societies, and ones which 
contribute to the development of individuals who choose ‘valuable’ capabilities. We 
don’t believe Sen would deny any of this, but the individualism of the approach lends 
itself to a diversion from these issues, and to a belief that there are autonomous 
independent individuals whose choices are somehow independent of the society in which 
they live ONLY INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS OR CAPABILITIES MATTER FOR 
ASSESSING DEVELOPMENT.  
 
These additions to the capabilities approach are not just theoretical addenda. They 
are likely to have important policy and research implications. On the policy side they 
lead to a focus on policies which bring about valuable change in these structures of living 
together and on policies to prevent dysfunctional structures from emerging, a focus which 
has generally been largely neglected in the current heavily individualistic approach to 
economics. This has, of course, been corrected to some extent, by the attention given to 
‘social capital’, but as its name proclaims, social capital is essentially instrumental, 
valued for the additional output it generates, and not because being part of a flourishing 
society is an essential aspect of a good life. On the research side, this perspective focuses 
attention on identifying structures of living together which are likely to be conducive to 
flourishing individuals – the investigation of empirical evidence concerning the 
conditions leading to healthy societies, communities and families. 
 
The second lacuna in the capability approach lies in the way it deals with (or 
rather fails to deal with) political economy - again this comes down to viewing people as 
autonomous and essentially separated from each other INSTITUTIONS AS 
INSTRUMENTAL TO HUMAN FREEDOMS. Some of the most important issues today 
concern the way ‘market forces’, often at a global level, are influencing decision-making, 
both within national democracies (and also non-democracies) and in the determination of 
the global rule-making of international agencies. But market forces here do not refer to 
the supply and demand for goods and services depicted in textbooks, but the influence of 
large corporations on political decision-making, through the financing of political parties, 
direct representation in powerful political parties, ownership and use of the media, and 
(probably of least importance) direct corrupt practices.  The current outcome is a political 
system that increasingly favours global capitalism. These forces can and are being 
challenged - by NGOs, Trade Unions, communities, appeals to legal rights, and, 
occasionally, political parties.  As these examples indicate, effectively countering such 
‘market forces’ can only occur via collective action of one sort or another.  
 
Where does the capability approach stand in all this? On the one hand, it gives us 
a framework to evaluate the consequences of various decisions - including the advance of 
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global capitalism. We can assess how far valuable capabilities are promoted by the 
system, albeit in a rather deficient way as far as the nature of community/family/societal 
aspects of life are concerned, as just argued.  We can consider the sustainability of any 
such progress.  If we conclude that the system is advancing capabilities as well as any 
other system, then we need do no more. But suppose we conclude that there are important 
defects in the system, which, in some respects is failing to promote valuable capabilities - 
for example, as a result of widening inequalities within and between countries; rising 
crime rates; worsening environmental problems; mediocre economic growth rates in most 
countries; increasing economic fluctuations at country and individual levels with 
inadequate or even diminishing social protection - all views that have good support.13 
Then promotion of valuable capabilities will need a change in policy at national and 
global levels, possibly a major change. 
 
In principle, the capability approach would look to a democratic consensus to 
bring about the change needed. But a democratic consensus may not be able to achieve 
this. Some of the reasons for this were mentioned in the first part of this paper. Here we 
would especially draw attention to the difficulties posed by the overwhelming power of 
large corporations so that in many contexts the democratic consensus is shaped by them, 
while the locus of decision-making (often a small individual nation) lacks the autonomy 
to take such decisions on its own. Decisions which challenge the capitalist system in a 
substantive way can only be affected by groups which wield power comparable to that of 
the interest groups that are being challenged. As noted, this almost invariably requires 
collective action of one kind or another. Though, of course, the first requirement for 
change is to have reasons for wishing to change things, the individual who is aiming to 
make valuable choices about capabilities, or the state which is trying to enhance the 
conditions which promote valuable capabilities, will be ineffective unless they are 
underpinned and supported by such collective action. Even then, of course, success is not 
assured.   
 
The capabilities approach is not entirely silent on these issues. DAF notes “the 
advantage of group activities in bringing about substantial social change”’ (DAF, 116).  
Yet the individualism of the approach tends to divert attention from collective political 
action, giving it a minor role. “While emphasising the significance of transaction and the 
right of economic participation… and the direct importance of market-related liberties, 
we must not lose sight of the complementarity of these liberties with the freedoms that 
come from the operation of other (non-market) institutions”. (DAF, 116). This statement 
well summarises both how groups are regarded as purely instrumental, and how far Sen is 
from seeing them as challenging, rather than complementing, what he describes as 
market freedoms.  
 
What this comes down to is that Sen has pointed economics and policy in a good 
direction - a huge improvement on utilitarianism and income maximisation - but he is 
handicapped by his individualistic perspective both from fully identifying the good life, 
and from analysing political mechanisms on how to get there. As presently advanced, his 
                                                 
13 See e.g. ; Berry and Stewart 1997; Panayotou 1999; Cornia 2001; Goldsmith 2001. 
 11
discussions of choice, democracy and politics are at an abstract idealistic (and typically 
unrealistic) level, well removed from making substantial changes in the real world.  
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